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While the last two years have seen heated discussions in 
Europe and the US about the costs of hosting Syrian and other 
refugees, debate is lacking about another aspect of Western 
countries’ involvement in the region’s conflicts: the extent of 
arms sales to the Middle East. Between 2011 and 2014 - based 
on conservative estimates - Europe earned €21 billion from the 
arms trade with the Middle East while it spent €19 billion on 
hosting approximately one million Syrian refugees. During that 
same period, the US earned at least €18 billion from weapons 
sales, while accepting only about 11,000 Syrian refugees.  
This study aims to address, as much as data availability al-
lows, the balance between Westerns countries’ income from 
official weapons export to the Middle East and the cost of host-
ing Syrian refugees fleeing a conflict that has witnessed imbri-
cations of most of the region’s countries. Accordingly, we will 
assess the value of official weapons sales between arms pro-
ducing countries and the Middle East between 2011 and 2014. 
The focus will be on trade with Jordan, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Turkey (abridged as JUQKKT), 
countries that have close links with the Syrian armed opposi-
tion. We then compare arms sales revenues with the cost of 
hosting Syrian refugees seeking protection in arms-exporting 
countries2 - while taking note that comparing earnings from the 
arms trade with the costs of hosting refugees does not address 
or assume away the immorality of weapons sales. We grouped 
weapons manufacturers and transfer countries under the 
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‘Friends of Syria’ banner – in reference to the group formed in 
2012 by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy composed of 
France, UK, US, Germany, Italy, Turkey, UAE, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt - and the rest under Eastern Europe. We 
assess JUQKKT’s entire weapons purchases consisting in both 
the build up of their national militaries as well their weapons 
imports intended for delivery to the war in Syria. In our view, it 
is as important to consider the replenishment of JUQKKT’s 
national arsenals, which are key to the repressive regimes con-
tributing to the wars and crackdown campaigns of the region. 
Indeed, over the 2012-2016 period, there has been an unprece-
dented build-up of the military arsenal of Gulf countries and 
Turkey with investments significantly increasing the capabili-
ties of their armed forces.3   
The focus on Western countries does not imply that they 
are the only weapons exporters to the region. However, reliable 
data on arms exports from China, Russia and Iran are not readi-
ly available. Nevertheless, we do try to provide some plausible 
estimates based on the very limited data available.4 While this 
prevents us from including these three countries in our calcula-
tions, it does not impact our main premise of the indirect but 
foreseeable link between Western arms transfer to the Middle 
East and the wave of refugees.  
We based our findings on official national reports, which 
record approved weapons export licenses rather than actual 
weapons shipped to the importing country (except for the case 
of Canada where records reflect actual weapons exports). The 
difference lies in that while export licenses may be approved in 
a given year, delivery may only occur several years down the 
line due to extended production cycles of military equipment. 
By extension, this also indicates that, even if export licenses 
cease to be approved today, weapons will continue to flow to 
the region for years to come. Furthermore, we note that official 
arms sales figures are conservative estimates knowing that at 
least 2%5 of the arms trade is unaccounted for and is conducted 
through behind-the-door deals. As we will also show, there is 
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strong evidence of countries exporting to JUQKKT without it 
being reflected in their national records.  
In calculating the cost of hosting refugees starting from 
April 20116, we assumed that governments have continued to 
support refugees from the time of their asylum applications up 
until the end of the period under study (July 2016)7. Also, for 
countries where specific data on the cost of hosting refugees is 
not available, in particular East European countries, we used 
Spain’s per capita cost as a proxy given closer costs of living in 
southern Europe to those in Eastern Europe.8  
 
The following table, graphs and Appendices developed by 
the author will form the basis of our discussion.9 
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Country 
Number 
of Refu-
gees 
Income from 
Weapons 
2011-2014  
(€ Billions) 
Ratio of Income 
from Weapons vs 
Cost of Hosting 
Refugees  
Ratio includ-
ing 2015-
2016 RRPs               
cf. Footnote 9 
Slovakia 64 0.11 283.56x 81.88x 
Croatia 448 0.28 100.22x 100.22x 
Czech Rep. 417 0.17 66.07x 39.55x 
USA 11,883 18.05 49.58x 8.29x 
Spain 9,562 1.64 27.81x 22.08x 
Italy 3,291 1.83 24.10x 19.05x 
UK 9,897 4.93 11.52x 4.87x 
France 12,142 3.09 10.03x 7.83x 
Poland 787 0.10 5.72x 5.72x 
Finland 1,752 0.12 2.74x 1.56x 
Belgium 16,384 1.30 1.84x 1.65x 
Canada [2] 25,000 0.91 1.78x 1.24x 
Austria 40,949 1.58 1.66x 1.62x 
Switzerland 13,282 0.47 1.54x 1.32x 
Bulgaria 18,167 0.13 1.20x 1.19x 
Greece 12,138 0.07 0.97x 0.97x 
Germany 401,018 3.97 0.43x 0.38x 
Sweden 109,044 0.72 0.40x 0.40x 
Netherlands 32,289 0.40 0.25x 0.22x 
Denmark 19,738 0.02 0.02x 0.02x 
Serbia [1] 314,327 0.04 0.02x 0.02x 
Hungary 79,116 0.00 0.01x 0.01x 
Table 1: Country Ranking  
Ranking of countries in terms of ratio of income from the arms trade 
vs. spending on refugees. Countries included in this table are those 
with more than €100 million in weapons exports or with more than 
10,000 asylum seekers. Most countries earned several times more 
from the sales of weapons than they spent on refugees: the highest 
profits go to Slovakia which made 283 times more, while the US 
earned 50 times more and Spain 28 times more. Greece broke even 
and others such as Sweden, Slovenia and Portugal spent slightly 
more on refugees.10 
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Based on our calculations, since 2011, Europe, the US and 
Canada have spent around €20.1 billion to host approximately 
one million Syrian refugees over five years. At the same time, 
Western arms manufacturers are benefitting from an increase in 
military equipment supplied to the Middle East, a considerable 
number of which has ended up in the war in Syria. Comments 
by UNHCR’s Europe Director are quite telling: the weapons 
industry “kills and creates refugees”11. 
 
Friends of Syria: Traditional proponents of the weapons industry 
The primary source of weapons to the Middle East remains by 
far the United States, which has historically - at best - 
misassessed the consequences of its foreign policy across the 
region. Leading European democracies are second to the US in 
arms trade to the region (until 2014) and are quick to entertain 
the largest Middle Eastern arms purchasers. Looking closer at 
governments’ policy in terms of the arms trade, it seems that 
international law and national regulations become malleable.  
With the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’, Western governments 
and think tanks were enthusiastic about the prospects of de-
mocratization in the Middle East. Nevertheless, one year after 
the ‘Arab Spring’, EU and US licensed arms sales to the region 
increased by 22%12 and 300%13 respectively.14 Several Gulf 
regimes, troubled by the tide sweeping the region, launched a 
counter-revolutionary campaign. The West played right into 
this campaign through, among other ways, the supply of mili-
tary equipment. Arms imports by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Ku-
wait increased respectively by 212%, 245% and 174% between 
the periods of 2007-2011 and 2012-2016; UAE’s purchases 
increased by 63% with continuous high levels of imports since 
2001.15 The war in Syria represents an extension of this trend: 
since the start of the conflict, Western-made weapons have 
been transferred to various Syrian opposition groups fighting 
the Syrian regime as well as each other.16  
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The Obama administration’s involvement in the Syrian 
war has been criticized for being ‘hands off’. At the same time, 
official involvement includes direct delivery of non-lethal 
weapons to rebel groups. Evidence indicates that Washington 
also seems to relinquish the transfer of lethal equipment to its 
Arab allies, yet tacitly approves Syria as final destination.17 Ev-
idently, US manufactured TOW missiles,18 previously sold to 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, frequently appear in videos shot by 
Syrian rebels. We would thus argue that America’s imbrication 
in the war is rather substantial: in February 2017, the Financial 
Times reports19 of a Syrian rebel commander who was on the 
one hand coordinating weapons transfers and salary payments 
to the Free Syrian Army (a loosely defined group) in Syria 
while also acting as a CIA informant. The commander explains 
that regular planning meetings with US and other representa-
tives were held at the covert operations room in Turkey known 
as Müşterek Operasyon Merkezi, modeled after the one in Jor-
dan. There, commanders “regularly inflated their forces’ num-
bers to pocket extra salaries, and some jacked up weapons 
requests to hoard or sell on the black market. Inevitably, much 
of that ended up in ISIS hands. Other groups cut in Jabhat al-
Nusra on deals to keep it from attacking them.” According to 
the now unemployed commander, the CIA and everyone else 
was aware of such practices, which were “the price of doing 
business.”20  
Furthermore, one of the latest revelation of US contribu-
tion in sustaining the war comes in the form of a leaked audio 
recording21 of former Secretary of State John Kerry who 
acknowledged “putting an extraordinary amount of arms in [re-
bel hands]” before noting that the US could send even more 
weapons but that it could be destructive for the armed opposi-
tion as it would drive “everyone [to up] the ante”. In addition, 
the war has benefited US weapons industry: at an annual con-
ference, Lockheed Martin’s Executive Vice President Bruce 
Tanner is recorded22 explaining the benefit from the war in Syr-
ia where he highlights the ‘unexpected’ upsurge in demand for 
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support of the F-22 Raptor aircraft and other products in fol-
low-up to the shooting down of the Russian aircraft by the 
Turkish air force. He added that Lockheed Martin, through its 
equipment, aims to heed the consequent increase in danger for 
US over-flights of Syrian territory. He also underscored that the 
company’s increase in earnings is due to UAE’s and Saudi 
Arabia’s involvement in the war in Yemen.  
Along the same lines, reports surfaced in 2012 that Syrian 
rebel groups23 used Swiss-made hand grenades initially sold to 
the United Arab Emirates. As a result, Bern decreased its arms 
exports to UAE from €132 million in 2012 to €10 million the 
following year, yet increased it again to €14 million in 2014. 
Weapons produced in Belgium were also transported24 to the 
various warring factions in Syria. Switzerland, which prides 
itself in being a harbinger of peace, earned between 2011 and 
2014 from weapons sales to the region 1.5 times what it spent 
on hosting 13,000 Syrian refugees. Similarly, while Belgium’s 
revenues from arms sales to Saudi Arabia and UAE amounted 
to €1.18 billion, it spent €0.71 billion on hosting 16,000 Syrian 
refugees. For other arm producing countries, these ratios are 
astoundingly higher as will be shown below. 
We note here that the EU implemented an arms embargo 
as well as other restrictive measures on Syria from May 2011 
to May 2013, with several amendments and extensions25. Its 
aim was mainly to prevent the export of equipment used in the 
violent repression by government forces while allowing the 
supply of non-lethal equipment to the Syrian National Coalition 
for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces. The European Coun-
cil declared in May 2013 it would review its position before 1 
August 2013, which however never took place. We note that 
this arms embargo was quite lax in nature, as it has been con-
tinuously breached. Based on an interview with the former 
Head of the European Union Delegation to Syria from 2013 to 
201626, the EU decision not to reconvene on the subject points 
to a tacit policy of consent on the status quo of weapons deliv-
eries to the Syrian National Coalition and their armed affiliates 
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on the ground. Also, according to the former official, the em-
bargo’s two-year timeframe at the time of adoption was set 
based on the misguided perception of the imminent fall of Ba-
shar Al-Asad.  
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Graph 2: Friends-of-Syria Weapon Sales vs. Spending on  
Refugees
Estimated spending on hosting refugees April 2011-July 2016 (€ Billions)
Revenues from official weapons sales 2011-2014 (€ Billions) 
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Based on our findings, ‘Friends of Syria’ earned €31.88 
billions in weapons sales to JUQKKT and spent €10.45 billions 
on hosting Syrian refugees. Discounting Germany’s numbers, 
the US, France, UK, and Italy made €27.92 billion in sales ver-
sus €1.18 billion spent on refugees, i.e. they earned 23 times 
more from weapons sales.  
Western European and US officials defend weapons sales 
on various grounds. For the German Chancellor, the market is 
strategic: the Merkel Doctrine27 defends the export of weapons 
as an essential instrument for peacekeeping in countries where 
Germany is not directly active but has vested interests. Accord-
ingly, the Chancellor calls for sustained arms deliveries in or-
der for partners to carry out common objectives. This included 
a 2011 deal, unthinkable under previous governments28, selling 
270 modern tanks to Saudi Arabia, with tacit Israeli approval. 
Furthermore, German commentators may worry that were 
Germany to refrain from exporting weapons, others counties 
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will not hesitate to. German journalist Jürgen Grässlin argues29 
however that the opposite is in fact true: when the Dutch par-
liament refused to export used Leopard tanks to Indonesia, 
Germany jumped in and approved the same deal. In the mean-
time, German opposition groups have called for a blanket ban 
on arms sales to Saudi Arabia over its human rights violations. 
This drove the Chancellor and Economy Minister Sigmar Ga-
briel to “critically review” arms sales to Riyadh and decided in 
201530 to focus exports to Saudi Arabia on “defensive” military 
gear, including all-terrain armored vehicles, aerial refueling 
systems, combat jet parts, patrol boats, and drones. Still, Ger-
man exports to Saudi Arabia increased31 from €179 million to 
€484 million in the first half of 2016. While Germany has been 
applauded for taking in the majority of Europe’s Syrian refu-
gees (about 400,000), it should be pointed out that Germany’s 
weapons industry has and continues to profit from conflicts in 
the Middle East prolonged by arms exports. One could argue 
that Germany’s perceived generosity in hosting refugees comes 
at a high cost to Syrians.  
Other arguments for military exports advance threats to 
the domestic labor market in case of implementing restrictions 
on the weapons industry. As such, not only industry-affiliated 
think-tanks but also mainstream media explicitly endorse the 
sale of weapons: long-time CNN news anchor, Wolf Blitzer32 
expressed concern about the possibility of halting sales to Sau-
di Arabia. In his view, the consequent risk of job losses across 
US defense contractors by far outweighs the moral argument of 
supporting Saudi war crimes in Yemen. Beyond the moral as-
pect, Wolf Blitzer overrates the industry’s job creation poten-
tial. In many countries in fact, the arms industry is a dying 
sector in need of government subsidies: in Germany, the indus-
try employs 100,000 people while the renewable energy sector, 
where skills could be transferred, is currently creating 
300,00033 jobs yearly. In the case of the US, allocating national 
spending to the clean energy, health or education sectors would 
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create between 50 to 140%34 more jobs than spending it on the 
military. 
Other officials counter-intuitively advocate for Western 
weapons sales based on humanitarian grounds. UK Foreign 
Secretary Boris Johnson said35 that were the UK to stop supply-
ing Saudi Arabia, “other Western countries […] would happily 
supply arms with nothing like the same compunctions or crite-
ria or respect for humanitarian law [as the UK]”. Some UK 
ministers have also said that Saudi Arabia, which has cleared 
its own military from any violations in the war in Yemen, is 
best placed to investigate its own alleged war crimes with Boris 
Johnson adding “the Saudi government has approached this 
matter with great seriousness36, and the seriousness it de-
serves”. Moreover, the UK’s former business secretary Vince 
Cable recently said he was mislead37 by the Ministry of De-
fense in signing off on the sale of laser-guided Paveway IV 
missiles to be used in Saudi Arabia’s bombing of Yemen. Ca-
ble initially blocked the export license due to concerns for ci-
vilian deaths, yet was promised “oversight of potential targets” 
which the Ministry now denies.  
Lastly, for some politicians, the case for weapons exports 
is made on a purely monetary basis. Former UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron boasted38 of his efforts to help sell “brilliant 
things” such as Eurofighter Typhoons to Saudi Arabia, on the 
same day the European Parliament voted for an arms embargo 
on Saudi Arabia over its bombardment of Yemen. His succes-
sor, Theresa May carried over a position in defense of weapons 
exports and said that London’s close relationship with Riyadh 
played a vital role in the fight against terrorism and that the 
Saudi regime’s co-operation was “helping keep people on the 
streets of Britain safe.”39 Ironically, politicians who are the 
most candid about using the threat of refugees as a scaremon-
gering tactic are also the most ardent defenders of the weapons 
industry: UKIP’s Nigel Farage is a case in point. 
In the case of France, ties with Saudi Arabia seem at an all 
time high40 with President Hollande awarding Crown Prince 
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Mohammed ben Nayef the Légion d’Honneur for Riyadh’s ef-
forts ‘fighting terrorism and extremism’. With over €3 billion 
in sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Tur-
key, France41 has spent ten times less (€0.31 billion) on hosting 
approximately 12,000 Syrian refugees. For Italy, Prime Minis-
ter, Matteo Renzi, propones exempting defense equipment 
manufacturers from paying VAT42 and allowing the industry to 
apply for EU research grants. Italy made an astounding 24 ratio 
in arms sales compared to its spending on 3,300 Syrian refu-
gees. 
The majority of Western leaders in countries with power-
ful military industries defend their weapons manufacturing 
companies. They seem to however disregard any correlation of 
their national arms exports with refugees fleeing conflicts. Ra-
ther, for the most part, they express a varying range of con-
tempt, disdain, or increasingly, xenophobia towards the waves 
of people seeking refuge. In countries welcoming asylum seek-
ers, refugees are expected to assume the mantel of indebtedness 
towards their hosts, despite the fact that they are asylees by ne-
cessity and in part as a consequence of their hosts’ economic 
gains.  
 
New kids on the block: Revival of E. Europe’s weapons industry 
Through the recent boost in arms trade to the Middle East, East 
European countries have opened the doors to weapons stock 
from former Yugoslavia and have revived their domestic 
weapons industries. At the same time, refugees on their soil are 
treated with considerable levels of discrimination.  
An investigation43 published in July 2016 by the Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and the Organized 
Crime and Corruption Reporting Project indicates that eight 
East Europeans countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Montenegro, Slovakia, Serbia and Romania) have 
since 2012 approved weapons and ammunition exports in value 
of just under €1.2 billion to Saudi Arabia (€806m), Jordan 
(€155m), UAE (€135m) and Turkey (€87m). 
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As indicated by the investigation, Saudi Arabia, the largest 
purchaser of these deals, does not count East Europeans coun-
tries as a traditional source for the replenishment of its military 
arsenal – it rather opts for more modern US equipment44 such 
as the Abram battle tank. Yet, since 2012, there is a surge of 
arms exports from Eastern Europe to Riyadh, which arguably is 
not intended for the country’s national forces. In fact, the BIRN 
report indicates that these East European exports, mainly des-
tined for Syria, are distributed by Saudi Arabia to its regional 
allies, Jordan and Turkey45 who steer two command hubs trans-
ferring the weapons by road or through airdrops into Syria. 
Gradually, ex-Yugoslav-made weapons started appearing46 in 
the hands of a plethora of armed groups around Syria’s battle-
fields. This has been documented by Eliot Higgins, an investi-
gative journalist and researcher specializing in open-source 
investigations, writing under the name of Brown Moses47, who 
has mapped the weapons’ spread throughout the conflict.  
Accordingly, Belgrade, Zagreb, Bratislava and Sofia have 
become main export hubs to the Middle East. Specifically, in 
2015 Serbia agreed to €135 million of arms48 export licenses to 
Saudi Arabia. Back in 2013, Serbia had rejected similar re-
quests for fear weapons would be diverted to Syria; these were 
worth $22 million based on Serbia’s national reports.49 Also in 
2013, the Serbian government denied four arms and military 
equipment import applications from the United Kingdom, Bul-
garia, Belarus, and the Czech Republic. These import worth 
$9.9 million were intended for re-sales (in the form of exports) 
to Saudi Arabia.50At a press conference in August 2016 follow-
ing the BIRN investigation, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar 
Vucic said that, while he was defense minister in 2013, he 
“probably received” intelligence that arms could end up in Syr-
ia. “Do not ask me what has changed. In 2015, I was not de-
fense minister and I can’t know [what happened]. I will take a 
look,” he said. Vucic was candid about the benefit of the arms 
trade and said at the 2016 press conference: “I adore it when 
we export arms because it is a pure influx of foreign currency.” 
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Serbia’s involvement in the seemingly lucrative produc-
tion and transfer of weapons to the Middle East is also attract-
ing new partnerships51: in 2013 UAE invested $33 million in 
the first phase of a joint development project of the Advanced 
Light Attack System missile system, one of the most modern 
land forces. The project will consist of a total of $220 million 
invested over a period of four years. Moreover, and as an addi-
tional point of interest regarding the indirect forces at play in 
the Syrian theater, a Serbian-owned consortium,52 CPR Impex, 
one of the region’s most important arms brokers,53 and Israel’s 
ATL Atlantic Technology bought Montenegro Defence Indus-
try (MDI) in February 2015. Since August 2015, MDI arranged 
export deals of 250 tons of ammunition and 10,000 anti-tank 
systems to Saudi Arabia in value of over €2.7 million. At the 
time of writing, MDI is under investigation by Montenegro’s 
special prosecution for organised crime and corruption over it’s 
alleged arms trading with Libya, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia, 
and the credibility of the end-user certificates, especially with 
countries under an international arms embargo.54 We note that 
prior to 2015 and since 200655 (availability of reports), Monte-
negro had not conducted any significant arms trade with the 
Middle East except for Israel, where the end user country was 
stated to be Afghanistan, Iraq or USA, and with Yemen in 
2010. We also highlight here that the recent rapprochement be-
tween Serbia and the UAE has been achieved thanks in part to 
the close involvement of Mohammed Dahlan,56 a former Pales-
tinian official close to UAE’s top leadership, who facilitated 
the arms trade between both countries. In 2015 Mohammed 
Dahlan and his family (as well as his political connections and 
business partners) were awarded Serbian citizenship as a “sign 
of gratitude for” the rapprochement with UAE. Dahlan and his 
wife were also awarded Montenegrin citizenship in 2010.57 
In Bratislava, public broadcaster Slovak Radio and Televi-
sion reported that in 2015 Slovakia exported to Saudi Arabia 
40,000 assault rifles, more than 1,000 mortars, 14 rocket 
launchers, almost 500 heavy machine guns and more than 
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1,500 RPGs. The Prime Minister defended the arms deal noting 
“if we don’t sell [arms], somebody else will, but don’t come 
crying to me if a lack of arms deals causes the loss of jobs for 
our people.”58 Slovakia welcomed 64 Syrian refugees costing 
Bratislava €400 thousands, translating into a 284 ratio of weap-
ons sales to cost of hosting refugees. 
For Croatia, data indicates that in 2013 and 2014 Zagreb 
sold over €155 million in ammunition to Saudi Arabia and 
€115 million to Jordan.59 We note that such deals do not follow 
regular trade patterns as, specifically for Jordan and based on 
official reports, there is little history of weapon exports be-
tween Zagreb and Amman: previous arms deals consisted of 
fifteen pistols worth USD $1053 sold to Jordan in 2001. More 
recently, the OCCRP reports that in December 2012 alone, ex-
ports to Jordan amounted to over USD$6.5 millions.60 The 
New York Times also reported 36 round-trip flights conducted 
between Amman and Zagreb from December 2012 through 
February 2013 where Jordanian cargo aircrafts airlifted a large 
Saudi purchase of infantry arms from Zagreb to Amman.61 As 
Croatia’s national reports do not indicate any exports to Jordan 
in 2012 one can safely assume the existence of under-the-table 
deals, which go unreported. A considerable amount of Croa-
tian-made weapons has been documented in the hands of rebel 
groups such as the Al-Nusra affiliated Nour al-Din al-Zenki 
Movement. More recently Elliot Higgings confirmed that both 
ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra are using Croatian-made weapons, 
although “how they acquired them is unclear. They could have 
been looted from other groups, sold between groups, or provid-
ed directly.”62 
As for Bulgaria, the largest state-run arms producer, VMZ-
Sopot has also hit the jackpot: after being insolvent in 2008, the 
plant has been working at full capacity since 2015.63 It paid off 
around €11 million in debt and has created 1,200 new jobs. 
Furthermore, sales growth went from around €19 million in the 
first half of 2015 to around €86 million in the first half of 2016. 
VMZ Sopot’s net profit surged to around €600,000 from a net 
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loss of €35 million in the same period. While Bulgaria took in 
18,000 Syrian refugees, a 2015 report by the German Pro Asyl 
foundation entitled “Humiliated, ill-treated and without protec-
tion” provides shocking accounts from asylum seekers in Bul-
garia.64 Refugees are subject to inhumane and degrading 
treatment by police and prison guards including extortion, 
abuse as well as torture.  
Based on reports by Balkan Insight, Bulgaria’s govern-
ment issued export permits for munitions and military equip-
ment sales worth €85.5 million to Saudi Arabia in 2014 — 
including ammunition worth €65.4 million, large caliber weap-
ons valued at €12.5 million and small calibre weapons (€5 mil-
lion).65 According to Ben Moores, a senior analyst at defence 
consultancy IHS Janes, such type of weapons were “very un-
likely to be used by the Saudi military” but are very heavily 
used in Yemen, Iraq and in Syria. The director of the British-
based consultancy group Armament Research Services also 
confirmed this in pointing to “notable quantities of arms and 
munitions produced in Bulgaria […being] documented in Syr-
ia.”  
As is the case with Croatia, Saudi Arabia has not been a 
major customer for Bulgarian weapons until 2014. According 
to a former Bulgarian military officer, the flights between Sofia 
and Tabuk, Saudi Arabia transported Bulgarian weapons, 
which were shipped by land to a distribution center in Jordan 
for Syrian opposition forces. In a BBC interview in late Octo-
ber 2015, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir openly 
acknowledged his country’s supply of arms to Syrian opposi-
tion fighters aimed at “[contributing] to changing the balance 
of the power on the ground.” Furthermore, Bulgaria was con-
siderably involved in the US “Train and Equip” program in-
tended to ready Syrian rebels whom Washington vetted as 
“moderate” for battles against the Syrian regime and ISIS. The 
US Special Operations Command, in charge of the US military 
support to Syrian rebels contracted a Bulgarian based company 
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for over €24.6 million in December 2014 to supply foreign 
weapons and ammunition.  
Through indirect transfer of considerable weapons quanti-
ties to rebel factions, East European countries have acquired an 
unexpected but important role in the war in Syria, one driven 
by monetary benefits. Nonetheless, East European countries are 
quick to encourage and push Syrian refugees towards continen-
tal Europe while accepting a symbolic number of asylum seek-
ers. We note that this block of countries does not hold known 
political or strategic interests in the Middle East, neither now or 
in the past when they have been historically absent from the 
region’s major conflicts.     
With regards to Russia, Moscow has historically been a 
major weapons supplier to the Syrian government – despite 
limited availability of data – we know that at least 10% of its 
arms exports went to Syria. “Russia reportedly has $1.5 billion 
worth of ongoing arms contracts with Syria for various missile 
systems and upgrades to tanks and aircraft, reportedly doubling 
that investment in small arms sales since the beginning of the 
Syrian civil war”. Furthermore, military training provided by 
Russia since the beginning of the conflict ought to also be 
quantified. Despite the very direct role Russia has played in the 
Syrian war, the country has currently only accepted 1,395 Syri-
an refugees on temporary asylum and has even deported one 
Syrian refugee.66 Still, Russia’s armed forces benefited from 
the war in Syria: in his February 2017 speech at the Lower 
House of Parliament, the Russian defense minister, Sergei 
Shoigu, reported that 162 samples of modernized armament 
have been tested during the war in Syria, including new jets - 
Su-30SM and Su-34 - as well as Mi-28N and Ka-52 helicop-
ters.67 Syria also has been the testing ground for high-precision 
munitions, sea-based cruise missiles, used for the first time in 
combat. Furthermore, the defense minister noted that close to 
all of the flight personnel of the Russian Aerospace Forces, 
86% of them, including 75% of the crews of long-range avia-
tion, 79% of tactical aviation, 88% of military transport and 
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89% of army aviation, have received combat experience in Syr-
ia.  
 
Cases of one-time weapons exporters & regular component 
suppliers  
In the previous sections we have highlighted how Middle East-
ern countries have purchased record high amounts of weapons 
from traditional and non-traditional arms manufacturer and di-
rected considerable amounts of those to their allies in Syria. In 
this section, we will aim to provide a brief overview of some 
covert transfers and flows of weapons into Syria. Such an 
overview will be non-exhaustive by definition given the under-
ground nature of and limited availability of sources on the sub-
ject. We note that such transfers are not accounted for in 
national export figures and form a significant part of the illicit 
weapons trade sustaining the war in Syria. This further under-
scores the premise of the conservative estimate of national 
arms trade figures, which we relied upon for our study.   
 
Transfers by third party states under civil strife 
There is evidence of weapons transfer from countries with on-
going conflict where government authority is limited and ex-
ports controls are lackluster. As such, Libyan missiles, looted 
during the 2011 upheaval were reportedly bound for Syria 
through Lebanon: according to an investigation by the UN 
Panel of Experts on Libya, Lebanese authorities seized on 27 
April 2012 a shipment of various arms and ammunition on 
board the Letfallah II cargo ship near the port of Tripoli, Leba-
non. The Panel concluded that Belgian-made FN Herstal FAL 
rifles found on the ship are “likely to be part of materiel deliv-
eries made by Qatar during the uprising [in Libya]” which had 
“since been illicitly transferred out of Libya, including towards 
other conflict zones”. According to the Panel, these rifles were 
loaded with a type of Pakistani ammunition that had been pre-
viously supplied by Qatar to Libya and had also been found on 
board the Letfallah II. Knowing that Syria did not purchase 
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Belgian FN Herstal FAL rifles after 1969, the use of post-1969 
models by the Syrian armed opposition groups and ISIS fight-
ers suggests they may have come from an external source.68  
Similarly, according to a 2014 study conducted by the 
Small Arms Survey on the proliferation of Man Portable Air 
Defence Systems in Syria69, some MANPADS in rebel hands 
were smuggled into Syria, including Chinese FN-6 systems not 
known to be exported to the Syrian government. Sudan was 
identified as a possible source of such missiles, which were re-
portedly purchased by Qatar and shipped through Turkey. Su-
dan is in fact among a handful of known importers of FN-6 
MANPADS and in view of the widespread proliferation of Su-
danese weapons and ammunition among armed groups. Simi-
larly, the Conflict Armament Research (CAR) report of 
February 2015 documenting material seized from ISIS during 
the battle of Kobane between 2014-2015 provides evidence of 
Chinese rifles, which had their identification obliterated.70 The 
same configuration of weapons had been found in South Sudan.  
 
IED components consistently supplied to ISIS 
According to Amnesty International, the majority of weapons 
seized by ISIS originate from looted Iraqi government stock. 
Still the group’s large arsenal seems to originate from 25 dif-
ferent countries.71 Following two years of investigation into 
ISIS’ weapons in Iraq and Syria, Conflict Armament Research 
revealed in its February 2016 report that Turkey is the most 
important source of components used to manufacture the ma-
jority of ISIS’ improvised explosive devices (IEDs).72 These 
consist of chemical precursors including a mixture of alumi-
num and nitrate-based fertilizer such as ammonium nitrate, as 
well as containers, detonating cord, cables, and wires. The in-
vestigation found that such elements were manufactured by or 
sold through 13 Turkish companies/intermediaries before being 
acquired by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. CAR notes that 
most of the companies involved serve the Turkish market and 
do not export goods to Iraq or Syria.  The report also highlights 
Syria Studies   51 
 
Centre for Syrian Studies – University of St Andrews, 2017 
 
the speed at which ISIS forces acquire IED materials, at times 
as little as one month following their lawful supply to commer-
cial entities, which speaks to the lack of monitoring by national 
governments and of companies alike according to the report.73 
While the trade itself is conducted lawfully, it is the smaller 
commercial entities transferring the materials to groups affiliat-
ed with ISIS forces, which “appear to be the weakest links in 
the chain of custody.” Additionally, in a related report on ISIS’ 
weapons manufacturing in Mosul, CAR research “provides 
stark evidence of an extremely robust procurement network” 
with consistent acquisition of identical products from the same 
sources, “almost exclusively from the Turkish domestic mar-
ket.”74  
 
Private individuals trading weapons 
News articles abound with evidence of arms also being smug-
gled into Syria through private deals. Balkan Insight reported 
on one such case: Bulgarian weapons were reported to be 
trucked into Homs in August 2012 and paid for by a Syrian 
businessman in the amount of €1.4 million for AK-47 rifles, 
grenade launchers and ammunition.75  A former Syrian opposi-
tion fighter said he was involved in 12 transfers of Bulgarian 
weapons as of 2013, the largest of which was worth €6.4 mil-
lion. The shipments were delivered at the Turkish-Syrian bor-
der in two trucks and were arranged by Syrian and Turkish 
nationals with connections to Bulgarian arms dealers.  
 
Transfers possibly in breach of international weapons embargos 
The Conflict and Armament Report of 2015 documented vari-
ous Iranian cartridges, which the People’s Protection Units 
(YPG) ceased from ISIS forces in Kobane. Most of these car-
tridges have been manufactured in 2006, with some as recently 
as 2013. Their presence outside Iran may indicate a violation of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), which prohibits 
Iranian exports of weapons and related products to all coun-
tries.76  
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In addition to weapons transfers sanctioned by national 
governments in support of rebel factions in Syria, arms and 
component smuggling and transfer from private groups and 
companies into Syrian territory add to the plethora of entities 
with stakes in the war in Syria. The acknowledgment of these 
illicit activities by governments and halting the flow of weap-
ons and funds sustaining the war would be the first step in con-
taining the drain of Syrians from Syria.  
 
A Dishonest Debate – for the most part 
Weapons industries are by and large applauded for turning the 
wheels of the economy at home. Little scrutiny is however car-
ried out over the consequences it is creating elsewhere in the 
world. In the last few years, with unprecedented quantities of 
weapons sold to the Middle East including those transferred to 
Syria, the conflict has driven millions of Syrians to seek refuge 
in Western countries. Aware of the consequences of weapons 
proliferation, European politicians may have opted for a 
tradeoff: making their taxpayers shoulder the short term cost of 
hosting refugees in exchange for profits to the arms industry. 
With reality of wars hitting closer to home, time may be oppor-
tune for a different debate in Western capitals. 
According to the former economic adviser to the president 
of the European Commission, Philippe Legrain, refugees are in 
fact unlikely to decrease wages or raise unemployment for na-
tive workers. Most significantly, calculations indicate that 
while the absorption of so many refugees will increase public 
debt for the EU by almost €69 billion between 2015 and 2020, 
during the same period refugees will help GDP grow by €126.6 
billion.77 In fact, a €1 investment in welcoming refugees can 
yield nearly €2 in economic benefits within five years. Legrain 
also highlights how refugees could solve an impending demo-
graphic challenge in Europe. Along these lines, Portugal con-
siders the refugee influx as an opportunity to revive some 
regions of the country.78 Lisbon is in fact offering to welcome 
up to 5,800 more refugees in addition to the 4,500 it already 
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agreed to take in as part of the European Union’s refugee quota 
system. Portugal has ‘only’ sold €500,000 worth of weapons to 
the Middle East.  
We thus deem the debate over the flows of refugees and 
the heavy burden on societies as flawed. Some European and 
North American societies unjustly blame refugees for fleeing 
war and seeking stability. By hosting them, they draw asylum 
seekers into financial and/or emotional indebtedness towards 
these societies. Yet these same societies, for the most part, dis-
regard Western countries’ complicity in cashing in on the wars 
refugees are escaping. Even more so, the question remains as to 
the distribution of profits from the global arms trade between 
national governments brokering the deals and arms manufac-
turers, knowing that it is the former who covers the cost of re-
settling refugees.79 Rather than at refugees, anger and protest 
should thus be directed towards the weapons industries and the 
revolving doors linking them to policy makers. The latter ought 
to face greater opposition to the war-profiting policies they es-
pouse. 
While this study focused on the case of Syrian refugees 
and the war in Syria, other conflicts in the Middle East deserve 
as much scrutiny. Arms sales by the US, Canada, Germany, 
UK and France feeding conflicts in Iraq, Yemen and Libya 
should also be taken into account in calculating the debt the 
West has towards the Iraqi, Libyan and Yemeni people. The 
sole reason keeping Yemenis from joining Syrian refugees in 
Europe and beyond is that Yemen is landlocked by Saudi Ara-
bia on the one hand and by a naval blockade on the other. Over 
3 million Yemenis are currently internally displaced and over 
14 million are food insecure.80 
The sustained economic, political and military support of 
Western democracies to Arab rulers of the Middle East, rang-
ing from the repressive, autocratic and most regressive regimes, 
remains the main guarantor for drawn-out wars and sustained 
impoverishment of the region’s populations. Such continuous 
support trumps any inherent cultural or religious characteris-
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tics, which may be advanced as endogenous reasons for the 
Middle East’s seeming inability for progress. Western military 
equipment guaranteed to the Gulf is an essential element of the 
Gulf-led counter-revolution aimed at repressing citizens and 
residents of these countries. The concentration of national re-
sources in the military industry and away from more productive 
sectors limits the advancement of these societies.  Such milita-
rization is both fueled by and feeds the region’s escalating 
power interplays and contributes to the cycle of violence and 
subjugation, ensuring an omnipresent -or at minimum- looming 
threat of war.  As we have outlined, there is considerable 
monetary return from the military aspect of such support. Still, 
the West and its local clients seemingly agree on the ensuing 
political benefits which remain as important: citizens of Gulf 
countries do not get to question the standing of their rulers and 
the unabated flow of oil to the West, while the deep-rooted 
support of the Palestinian cause against Israeli occupation and 
oppression remains subdued. 
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